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SINCE  1968, wages have been increasing at a fairly steady rate averaging 
6 percent annually. In 1969-70, the question was why wages continued to 
increase so rapidly during a recession. Two hypotheses were offered to 
explain this puzzle: first, that demographic changes in the labor force had 
caused the measured unemployment rate to overstate the ease of the labor 
market; and second, that  an  increase in  inflationary expectations had 
adversely shifted the  inflation-unemployment tradeoff.1 In  1973, many 
economists were puzzled about why wages were increasing as slowly as 6 
percent, especially given the very rapid increases in consumer prices. In 
1974:2, however, the six-year wage plateau was exceeded and the rate of 
wage increase  jumped to 9.6 percent. 
Note: I am indebted  to the National Science  Foundation  and the National Institutes 
of Health  for research  support,  and to Princeton  University,  with which  I was associated 
when much of this work was done. Valuable  comments  were provided  by Albert Rees, 
Stephen A.  Ross, Susan M. Wachter, and members of the Brookings panel. I am 
grateful  to James  Orr  for excellent  research  assistance. 
1. See the papers by Robert J. Gordon, "Inflation in Recession and Recovery," 
Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity  (1:1971), pp. 105-58, and "Wage-Price  Controls 
and the Shifting  Phillips  Curve,"  BPEA (2:1972), pp. 385-421; and by George  L. Perry, 
"Changing  Labor  Markets  and  Inflation,"  BPEA  (3:1970), pp. 411-41. Theoretical  back- 
ground for the expectational  model, in an accelerationist  framework,  is provided in 
Edmund  S. Phelps  and others,  Microeconomic  Foundations  of Employment  and  Inflation 
Theory  (Norton, 1970). 
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This paper offers an explanation for  recent wage developments and 
current  wage prospects and, in particular,  examines the lack of responsive- 
ness of wages in the short run to  anti-inflation policies. Wages are ap- 
proached from three directions. The first approach involves an inspection 
of relative wages among industries. Many economists have argued that 
when the traditional relationships among industry wages shift, the attempt 
to restore  customary differentials  can cause upward pressure on wages. An 
analysis of relative wages also identifies the contribution that individual 
sectors make to particular problems. The second approach concerns the 
recent major coliective bargaining settlements and their implications for 
near-term wage trends. Specific attention is paid to the pattern emerging 
from the steel settlement and to the spread of escalator clauses. The third 
approach  uses a simplified  wage equation to forecast the near-term  outlook 
for wage inflation.2 The wage equations estimated here have a decidedly 
accelerationist look.  If long lags are permitted between price and wage 
adjustments,  the coefficient on the long-run price term is close to unity. 
As a consequence of the highly structured and institutionalized nature 
of  the labor market, wages respond with a relatively long  lag to  their 
economic determinants.  The result is that the ability of government policy 
to influence  wage inflation over short intervals is seriously circumscribed- 
whether it relies on fiscal or monetary tools  or on wage-price controls. 
Policy swings of the "stop-go" variety are unlikely to reduce the inflation 
rate. Due to the length of the contract period, as well as the nonlinear 
response of  wages to  unemployment, a  policy  aimed at  causing sharp 
but deep downturns is probably less efficient in controlling inflation than 
one aimed at shallow but longer intervals of slow real growth. 
Relative Wages 
In a study of the overall wage outlook, relative or interindustry wages 
are of interest because distortions in traditional relationships may cause 
upward pressure on wages. 
As a starting  point for an analysis of interindustry  wages and as a method 
of defining the traditional wage structure, I have reestimated my  inter- 
2. The specification  of the Phillips curve used in this paper and its advantages  for 
forecasting  purposes  are discussed  in the section on wage equations. Michael L.  Wachter  509 
Figure 1.  Coefficient  of Variation  of Interindustry  Wages in Manufacturing, 
Actual and Predicted, 1947-74 
Coefficient  of variation,  CV 
.185 
.175  a 
.165  i  ctual 
.155 
:Predicted  .145 
.1350 
.125  / 
L~~~~~ 
1945  1950  1955  1960  1965  1970  1975 
Sources: Equation for CV, the coefficient  of variation, discussed in the text; official data on the consumer 
price index; unemployment rates and wages from Cur)renzt  WVage  Developmnents, various issues. 
a. Thie  value for 1974 is a projection based on data available through the first half of the year. 
industry wage equation for manufacturing for the  period 1947-73  using 
annual data.3  The paths of the predicted and actual values of the coefficient 
of variation of interindustry  wages in manufacturing (CV), the dependent 
variable, are plotted in Figure 1. The equation is of  the form 
CV =  0.2253  -  0.3319P  -  0.2662  U-1  -  0.0040G  +  0.0300T  -  0.0181K, 
(21.4)  (5.39)  (9.31)  (1.70)  (1.97)  (5.10) 
R2 = 0.9619; Durbin-Watson  statistic =  1.7. 
where U is the unemployment rate, P is the rate of inflation as measured 
by the consumer price index, G and K are dummies for the guidepost and 
3. Interindustry  wages within manufacturing  are used because of the relatively  high 
quality  of the data  (the  specific  series  is average  hourly  earnings  excluding  overtime  on the 
two-digit  level of the standard  industrial  classification)  and the good mix of high- and 
low-wage  industries.  The coefficient  of variation  is constructed  as an unweighted  average 
of the twenty-one  manufacturing  industries  in the SIC. See Michael  L. Wachter,  "Cycli- 
cal Variation  in the Interindustry  Wage Structure,"  Americanl  Economic  Review,  Vol. 60 
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Korean War periods, respectively, and T is a time trend. The numbers in 
parentheses are t-statistics. The equations are estimated using Almon lags, 
and the coefficients shown are the sum of the weights. The lags are quite 
long; the average lags are approximately three years and the full lags are 
five years.4 The major insight from this approach is that the traditional 
interindustry  wage structure  varies systematically over the cycle. The reason 
is rooted largely in the fact that the high-wage sectors of the economy 
(which are largely unionized) have a longer planning or contract period 
than the low-wage, more competitive, sectors. The planning or contract 
period is the interval over which the wage of the firm, including guaranteed 
periodic increases, is  fixed or predetermined; it  generates both  lags  of 
adjustment, equal to the length of the contract, and lags due to expecta- 
tional effects. As a consequence of the longer forecasting horizon of the 
high-wage sectors, they tend during periods of historically low unemploy- 
ment and high inflation to underestimate the economy-wide rate of wage 
change with the result that the wage dispersion narrows. (Conversely, it 
widens when labor markets are slack.5) 
The period of interest can be divided into three short intervals: the pre- 
controls period, 1969-71; Phases I and II; and finally, Phases III and IV. 
4. Since this equation  is described  elsewhere,  I will not go into a detailed  exposition 
here. See ibid., and Michael L. Wachter,  "Phase II, Cost-Push  Inflation,  and Relative 
Wages,"  American  Economic  Review,  Vol. 64 (June 1974), pp. 482-91. 
5. Throughout  the paper I use the terms  "high-wage  sector"  and "unionized  sector" 
interchangeably.  There  are, however,  differences  and the theory relates  more directly  to 
high-wage  industries. Specifically, in some unionized industries the union is weak, 
largely  where  the product  market  is competitive  and national  in scope. For a discussion 
of this point, see Harold M. Levinson,  "Unionism,  Concentration,  and Wage Changes: 
Toward a Unified Theory," Industrial  and Labor Relations  Review,  Vol. 20 (January 
1967),  pp. 198-205.  Similarly  some high-wage  industries,  particularly  those whose prod- 
uct market  is noncompetitive,  are not unionized.  A discussion  of why noncompetitive 
high-wage  industries  may prefer  a planning  period  similar  to the fixed-contract  period  is 
contained  in Stephen  A. Ross and Michael  L. Wachter,  "Wage  Determination,  Inflation, 
and the Industrial  Structure,"  American  Economic  Review,  Vol. 63 (September  1973), 
pp. 675-92. 
An additional  explanation  for cyclical  variation  in the interindustry  wage structure  is 
that the desired  wage premium  of the high-wage  sector may vary  over the cycle. See, for 
example,  the work of John T. Dunlop, Wage  Determination  Under  Trade  Unions  (Mac- 
millan, 1944); Charles  C. Holt, "Job Search,  Phillips' Wage Relation, and Union In- 
fluence:  Theory  and Evidence,"  in Phelps and others, Microecon2omic  Foundationls;  and 
Albert Rees, The  Economics  of Trade Unions  (University  of Chicago Press, 1962). The 
timing problem,  introduced  by the existence of fixed-term  wage contracts, is stressed 
by H. G. Lewis, Unionism  and  Relative  Wages  in the United  States (University  of Chicago 
Press, 1963). Michael L.  Wachter  511 
The precontrols period was marked by rapidly increasing wages, with the 
high-wage, unionized sectors receiving by far the largest increases. This 
development is reflected  in the relatively large first-year  union-wage adjust- 
ments shown in Table 1, which also gives life-of-contract wage adjustments. 
For  comparison, Table 2 shows average hourly earnings in various in- 
dustries. The widening of the wage structure,  however, should be attributed 
not  to  cost-push inflation but to  the cyclical phenomenon traditionally 
associated with rising unemployment. Specifically, as Figure 1 illustrates, 
the wage structure among manufacturing industries narrowed during the 
1960s as the high-wage sector consistently underestimated the tightness 
in the labor market and the rate of inflation during the contract period. 
After erring on the low side during the 1960s, the high-wage sectors began 
to catch up as contracts expired during the years 1969-71. Furthermore,  by 
projecting into the early 1970s  the tight labor markets of the late 1960s, the 
high-wage sectors overestimated the  overall rate of  wage change.  The 
widening of the wage structure in this period, as indicated in Figure 1, 
was consistent with past cyclical fluctuations in relative wages. 
Similar results appear when the analysis is extended to nonmanufactur- 
ing  industries. The  two  possible  exceptions  are municipal government 
Table 1. Annual Rate of Change in Wages in Major Collective Bargaining 
Settlements, First Year and Life of Contract, 1968-1974:2 
Percent 
Industry  and 
measure  of change  1968  1969  1970  1971  1972  1973  1974:1a 1974:2a 
All industries 
First year  7.4  9.2  11.9  11.6  7.3  5.8  6.2  9.2 
Life of contract  5.9  7.6  8.9  8.1  6.4  5.2  5.3  7.4 
Manuifacturing 
First year  7.0  7.9  8.1  10.9  6.6  5.9  6.1  n.a. 
Life of contract  5.2  6.0  6.0  7.3  5.6  4.9  4.9  n.a. 
Nonmanuifacturing 
First year  7.8  10.8  15.2  12.2  7.8  5.7  6.3  n.a. 
Life of contract  6.5  9.3  11.5  8.9  6.9  5.3  5.5  n.a. 
Constructioni 
First year  8.7  13.1  17.6  12.6  6.9  5.0  5.2  n.a. 
Life of contract  8.6  13.1  14.9  10.8  6.0  5.1  4.8  n.a. 
Source:  Cuirrent W7age  Developments,  various  issues. 
a.  Quarterly  change at annual rate; preliminary. 
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Table 2.  Annual  Rate of Change from Previous Year in Average Hourly 
Earnings,  Private Nonfarm Economy, by Sector, 1968-74a 
Percent 
Sector  1968  1969  1970  1971  1972  1973  1974:Ib  1974:2b 
Total private  nonfarm 
Current  dollars  6.6  6.6  6.7  7.0  6.3  6.3  6.0  9.6 
1967 dollarsc  2.3  1.2  0.7  2.6  3.0  0.0  -5.6  n.a. 
Mining  5.6  7.7  5.8  5.7  7.5  7.2  13.3  12.9 
Contract  construction  7.1  8.8  9.3  8.5  6.4  6.6  5.0  8.5 
Manufacturing  6.2  6.0  6.2  6.6  6.2  5.9  6.0  11.2 
Transportation  and 
public utilities  5.5  6.4  6.1  9.2  10.5  8.5  5.3  4.3 
Wholesale  and retail 
trade  7.2  6.4  6.1  5.9  5.2  6.1  6.7  10.0 
Finance,  insurance,  and 
real estate  5.8  6.0  6.0  6.6  5.2  5.2  3.9  7.8 
Services  6.6  6.9  7.2  7.3  5.6  5.8  7.8  10.0 
Source:  Current  Wage  Developmnents, various  issues. 
a. Adjusted for overtime (in manufacturing  only) and for interindustry  employment shifts. 
b.  Quarterly  change at annual rate; preliminary. 
c. As deflated  by the CPI. 
n.a. Not available. 
and contract construction. The rate of increase of average hourly earnings 
in construction has consistently outpaced that in the economy as a whole, a 
secular trend that became even more pronounced in 1969-71.6 The widen- 
ing of wage differentials  for municipal employees is a recent phenomenon 
and may reflect  a once-and-for-all  premium  from the spread of unionization 
in this sector. With these two exceptions, interindustry wages have been 
in the traditional alignment over the recent period. 
Wage controls exercised under Phases I and II seem to have endorsed 
this pattern  of wage settlements, as those who served on the Pay Board have 
testified. First, although the Pay Board had a strategy aimed at affecting 
bargaining situations involving large unions, "Phase II caught the tail end 
of a catch-up wage round, and Pay Board policies permitted the adjust- 
6. Other  factors  besides  cost-push  pressure  could explain  the upward  spiral  of relative 
wages in construction.  An explanation  based on changes  in the mix of slkilled  and un- 
skilled workers  seems implausible  because wage increases  for both groups in this in- 
dustry  have outstripped  wage changes elsewhere.  Studies that take note of the recent 
slowdown  in the size of wage increases  in construction  suffer  from their concentration 
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ment to take place."7 Second, "the industries that obtained approvals for 
higher increases-the  'extractive' sector (chiefly coal  mining) and trans- 
portation (railroads, longshore, trucking, and postal services)-are  highly 
unionized."8 The influence of Phase II is shown graphically in Figure 1, 
where the residual for  1972 is sharply positive, indicating that the high- 
wage differential was well above its predicted value. Hence, if anything, 
Phase II seems to  have allowed the high-wage sectors to  increase their 
wage premium in  1972 beyond the level predicted by the existing labor 
market conditions. 
The drop in the magnitude of wage settlements between 1971 (which was 
mostly a precontrols year) and  1972 (when controls were in effect) was 
actually quite moderate in terms of provisions for the entire life of the 
contract. The big decline occurs in "first-year  adjustments." The timing of 
contract  settlements probably  explains  these  developments.  Industries 
whose settlements came due in  1972 had previously negotiated wages in 
1969, the first catch-up year after the 1961-68 narrowing in differentials. 
Hence, these industries had already begun to reestablish their more tradi- 
tiolial differentials.  On the other hand, the wage bargains in 1971 for in- 
dustries on  three-year contracts were the initial attempt to  redress the 
1961-68 decline; hence the front loading of the 1971 settlements. Further- 
more, on the basis of figures relating to wages over the life of the contract, 
unions that settled in 1968 and 1971, and in 1969 and 1972, received the 
same average 14 percent increase over the two contracts. (In fact, the same 
increase is apparent for the unions in the 1970-73 contract cycle.) 
For the year 1973 the residual of the relative wage equation returned to 
zero, so that whatever distortions occurred in 1972 were largely undone. 
Projections for 1974 indicate that relative wages are again on target, in 
terms of their traditional position over the business cycle. 
It has been suggested that wage "distortions," or changes in interindustry 
wage differentials,  may be a factor determining  the rate of wage inflation.9 
The model of relative  wages suggests that, rather  than being an independent 
7. Daniel J. B. Mitchell and Arnold R. Weber, "Wages and the Pay Board," in 
American  Economic  Association,  Papers  and Proceedings  of  the Eighity-sixth Annual 
Meetilng, 1973 (American Economic Review, Vol.  64, May  1974), p. 90. 
8. Daniel J. B. Mitchell, "Phase II Wage Controls,"  Industrial  and Labor  Relations 
Review,  Vol. 27 (April 1974),  p. 361. 
9. See, for example,  Arnold H. Packer  and Seong H. Park, "Distortions  in Relative 
Wages  and Shifts in the Phillips  Curve," Review  of Economics  and Statistics,  Vol.  55 
(February 1973), pp. 16-22; and Wachter, "Cyclical Variation." 514  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1974 
cause of inflation, distortions of usual differentials are determined coinci- 
dentally with wage inflation by current  and lagged values of the unemploy- 
ment rate and the rate of price inflation.10  The coefficient of variation (CV), 
as a measure of wage dispersion, may indeed help to explain wage inflation, 
but only because it reflects  previous values of price changes and unemploy- 
ment that determine  current  rates of wage increase. Hence, if CV is used as 
an explanatory variable in a wage equation, it should be interpreted as a 
proxy, representing  the lagged response of wage changes to labor market 
conditions and price changes. 
The evidence suggests that there is  no  backlog  of  compressed wage 
differentials  in early 1974 that will need to be expanded in late 1974 and 
1975 as long as price inflation and conditions in the labor market remain 
unchanged. First, the wage structure is wider than it was in  1969-70 so 
that the high-wage sectors have had their catch-up round of  increases; 
second,  the  relative-wage equation  is  on  target.  The  major  potential 
trouble point is contract construction which, contrary to the relative-wage 
equation, had wage changes greater  than those in other sectors before 1972. 
The very high unemployment rates in this sector as well as the recent surge 
in nonunion construction, however, should dampen wage increases and 
might finally cause some narrowing of the relation with other wages. 
Wage Contract  Settlements 
The developments during the 1969-73 period do not mean that widening 
in relative wages cannot occur if labor markets weaken. Wage differentials 
are on target in early 1974, but the expected differential will widen if un- 
employment rises. The opening wedge of such a widening can be seen in 
the can, aluminum, and steel settlements of 1974. The wage pattern estab- 
lished in these agreements will continue to influence both relative wages 
and the absolute rate of  wage change until those  settlements expire in 
1977.11 
10. For a theoretical  development  of this model, see Ross and Wachter, "Wage 
Determination." 
11. The following  discussion  of wage settlements  should not, however,  be interpreted 
as a kind of union-wage  model of overall  wage determination.  Rather,  the implications 
of current  wage contracts  should  be viewed  in the context of the relative-wage  equation. 
Current  and lagged values of unemployment  and inflation  determine  the current  bar- 
gaining  packages  and, as labor  market  conditions  evolve, the path of relative  wages and 
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The current  wage pattern,  although generally  heralded  as quite moderate, 
should be so classified only on the assumption that the economy will be 
operating near full capacity over the  next three years, contrary to  the 
verdict of most current  economic forecasts. The steel settlement provides an 
example of a contract that can increase differentials in the face of higher 
unemployment and lower price inflation. The settlement has been priced 
in the following manner:12 
Deferred increases under the preceding contract  $0.39 
Basic wage increase spread over three years  0.84 
Basic fringe increase spread over three years  0.92 
Escalator increases assuming a 7 percent annual increase 
in the consumer price index  1.10 
Total  $3.25 
The  American Iron and Steel Institute estimates that  the  base  hourly 
rate for wages plus fringes amounted to $8.40 in February 1974.13  On this 
base, the three-year  increase is 38.7 percent. Omitting the fringe increase, 
which is difficult  to price accurately, and using a base hourly wage rate of 
$5.90, the three-year  increase is 39.5 percent. Without the deferred  increase 
of $0.39, the overall wage gain falls to 33 percent. The escalator provision 
allows a 1  raise for every 0.3 point change in the CPI. This amounts to 
approximately 80 percent  protection against inflation and, by construction, 
the rate of protection rises slowly with increases in consumer prices. The 
basic wage increase of  $0.84 amounts to a 14 percent increase. With esca- 
lator protection of 80 percent this basic wage increase should allow a real 
wage increase of at least 3 percent per year evaluated at any point in the 
range of currently  foreseeable rates of inflation. 
Given conditions at the time the settlement was reached-the  economic 
boom in the steel industry and other primary goods processors, the rela- 
tively  stable economy,  and  the  widespread expectation  that  the  battle 
against inflation would be deserted to secure low unemployment at election 
time-the  settlement was certainly generous, but not unreasonable. As all 
economic forecasters know, the current period has been a difficult one to 
predict. In early 1974 negotiators and economists alike were forecasting a 
strong economy over the near future. If the nation sustains a prolonged 
slowdown, however, steel and the other industries that have settled on this 
12. These  estimates  were  provided  by George  L. Perry.  With  appropriate  assumptions, 
similar  kinds of numbers  can be extracted  from data in Current  Wage  Developments. 
13. See Monthly  Labor  Review,  Vol. 97 (June 1974), pp. 68-70. 516  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1974 
package may find it costly indeed. For example, if a deep recession were to 
develop and succeed in reducing the inflation rate to 3 percent, the steel 
settlement would still lead to an increase in wage rates of approximately 
22  percent over three years (excluding the  deferred increases). Hence, 
although the escalator clause ensures some flexibility in the wage settle- 
ment, the protected increase in real wages is well above the historical rate 
observed during recessions. As in previous downturns, rising unemploy- 
ment and declining inflation will widen the interindustry  wage structure as 
increases  in the more competitive industries become smaller while the high- 
wage sectors are locked into more generous contracts. 
At present it appears that, with two exceptions, the steel contract will set 
the pace for other settlements due to expire in 1974 and early 1975.14  The 
first exception is the coal  industry, where the competitive pressures in- 
herent in its unique current position  may well mean a wage settlement 
higher than the prevailing pattern. The size of the settlement will largely 
reflect the rapid rise in the demand for coal workers operating against a 
labor supply that is likely to be inelastic as a consequence of the nature 
of the work. Second, the railroad contract remains, as always, unpredict- 
able. As a consequence of their uniqueness, however, neither of these two 
negotiations is likely to have important spillover effects on wages within 
the unionized sector.15 
Although the  steel pattern may  represent the  upper bound  of  wage 
contracts, a particularly strong point is the degree of inflation protection 
built into the escalator provision. In other contracts the level of protection 
is generally lower. If the next few years witness much less inflation, the 
gap between the steel pattern and other contracts will be reduced.  -The 
wage data of Table 1 exclude escalator increases that are not automatically 
guaranteed.16  Hence, they represent the zero-inflation case,  and set the 
lower bound  of  major wage  settlements in  the  unionized  sector.  Un- 
fortunately, the  available  data  do  not  permit an  accurate estimate  of 
14. Most of the major  contracts  for 1974  have  already  been negotiated.  The same was 
true  at this time in 1971, when Phase I was introduced. 
15. It is obvious  that strikes  in either  of these  industries  could have a severe  impact  on 
the economy. 
16. Guaranteed  escalator  increases  are a type of deferred  increase in that they auto- 
matically  come into effect regardless  of the rate of inflation. These increases  are con- 
sidered  part  of the increases  called  for by the escalator  formula  when the inflation  rate is 
greater  than zero. Michael L.  Wachter  517 
deferred wage increases, including escalators, in the union contracts that 
will be in force over the next few years.17 
Unions (or the high-wage sectors) have a major impact on the inflation 
problem in that they serve to lock important sectors of the economy into a 
given wage pattern that may run counter to government goals or to strong 
cyclical swings in the economy. Whereas the discrete timing works on the 
side of wage restraint when inflationary pressures are building up (as in 
1965-69 and 1972-73), it prevents a prompt slowdown in wage inflation 
when the  government moves  into  the  "stop"  phase  of  the  "stop-go" 
syndrome.18  These factors,  as  well  as  the  potential  for  important dis- 
continuities  that can arise from the formation of expectations, the bunching 
of contracts in certain years, and spillovers among contracts, suggest that 
attempts  to bring down the inflation rate will cost less if pursued gradually, 
over a relatively  extended period.19 
Assuming the economy does slow down, relative wages will continue to 
widen as wage changes in the more rapidly responding competitive sectors 
slow while those in the high-wage sectors remain at the higher level dic- 
tated by their contracts. Without escalator clauses, the current pattern 
would pose  a greater problem for  policymakers; presumably the  fixed 
wage gains would have been larger and there would be considerably more 
pressure for monetary and fiscal policy simply to validate the higher ex- 
pected inflation rate. The potential problem in the current pattern, even 
including  the escalator clauses, is that the protected increases in real wages, 
17. The most current  analysis  on the impact of escalator  clauses  is Jerome M. Staller 
and Loren M. Solnick,  "Effect  of Escalators  on Wages  in Major Contracts  Expiring  in 
1974,"  Monthly  Labor  Review,  Vol. 97 (July 1974),  pp. 27-32. The new series  of the Bu- 
reau  of Labor  Statistics  on the "effective  date,"  as clistinct  from  the date of negotiation,  of 
wage  changes  does not solve the problem.  With  escalator  clauses  being  rapidly  strength- 
ened and extended to new workers, past measures of  aggregate  escalator increases 
understate  what is likely to occur  in the future. 
18. This point is analyzed  in some detail in Ross and Wachter,  "Wage Determina- 
tion." 
19. Although  a gradual  and prolonged  slowdown  in real  growth  may be more  effective 
than  a steep  and short  recession,  the burden  of unemployment  that the two impose may 
fall on different  groups.  In a sustained  period of slow real growth (below the potential 
growth  rate), the "bumping"  process, in which the skilled workers  displaced  in a par- 
ticularly  hard-hit  industry  replace the unskilled  workers  in a less vulnerable  industry, 
will have  more time to evolve. These distributional  questions  must be considered  and a 
mechanism  for spreading  the sacrifices  among all members  of society developed.  The 
lack of such  a mechanism  is a major  reason why previous  anti-inflation  battles  have not 
been sustainable. 518  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1974 
which are not responsive to interperiod changes in economic conditions, 
will make it more difficult to  slow inflation and will impose what will 
appear to be a "cost-push"  element stemming from wages in the unionized 
sectors. 
Wage  Equations 
This section presents wage equations using the official unemployment 
and inflation rates as independent variables, in order to forecast near-term 
changes in wage inflation. The previous sections stressed the lags in the 
wage determination  process. First, with labor unions and long-term fixed 
contracts, lags of adjustment of three years are likely. Second, the relative- 
wage equation calculated mean lags of three years with significant weights 
extending out five years. Most previously estimated wage-change equations, 
on the other hand, embody only short lags, and some use only contempo- 
raneous variables or variables lagged only one quarter.20  The question of 
long  lags versus almost immediate adjustment of  wages has  important 
implications for policy to counter inflation. 
For purposes of forecasting wages, the official unemployment rate and 
some inflation rate as independent variables have several advantages over 
more complicated specifications that include constructed variables such as 
hidden unemployment or  unemployment  dispersion.  First,  these  con- 
structed variables are often themselves functions of official unemployment 
and inflation rates. Hence,  the equation used here may be viewed as a 
quasi reduced-form approach. Second, the literature holds no consensus 
on the form of at least some of these functional relationships. For example, 
some authors view short-run fluctuations in labor force participation as 
dependent on  a distributed lag  of  official unemployment; while others, 
20. A step toward reconciling  these differences  is found in Gordon, "Inflation in 
Recession  and Recovery,"  and "Wage-Price  Controls."  In some respects,  the long lags 
are consistent  with, and provide  a complementary  interpretation  to, Perry's  "habitual" 
rate  of inflation-see "Changing  Labor  Markets  and  Inflation"-and Sidney  Weintraub's 
"exogenous"  wage variable-see  Some Aspects of  Wage Theory  and Policy (Chilton, 
1963). The lags are also consistent with an expectational  framework-for example, 
Phelps and others, Microeconomic  Foundations;  however, much of the expectational 
literature  has been developed  within the confines  of a competitive  model. The analysis 
of this paper  stresses  the role of adjustment  as well as expectational  lags operating  within 
an institutional  framework. Michael  L. Wachter  519 
including myself, see relative wages and money illusion as the determining 
influences. The  result is  that  constructed variables may  confound  un- 
employment and inflation effects so that the elasticities of wage changes 
with respect to the two official variables may be difficult to  disentangle 
from one another.2' 
PRICE  AND  UNEMPLOYMENT  VARIABLES 
Table 3 presents estimates from several wage equations. For the price 
term, the consumer  price  index (CPI), the private  nonfarm deflator  (PNFD), 
and the private consumption deflector (PCON) were tested. The PNFD 
performed marginally better than the PCON and significantly better than 
the CPI. The variable was entered, without experimentation, with a lag of 
twelve quarters,  beginning with observation t -  1. The lag structures  had 
a  mean  lag  of  over five  quarters with  statistically significant weights 
extending into  the  third year.22 The  lag  structure for  equation  (3)  of 
Table 3 is presented  in Table 4. 
The long-run coefficients on both PNFD and PCON were close to unity 
in all of these quasi reduced-form equations. Only the coefficient of  CPI 
was significantly below unity when entered as a distributed lag. (When 
the price term was entered without lags, all the coefficients were around 
0.5.) The finding of a price coefficient of unity in the best-fitting equations 
strongly supports  the accelerationist  view of the inflation process. Accelera- 
21. See, for example,  Ray C. Fair, "Labor Force Participation,  Wage Rates, and 
Money  Illusion," Review of Economics anid  Statistics,  Vol.  53 (May  1971), pp.  164-68; 
Robert E. Lucas, Jr., and Leonard A.  Rapping, "Real Wages, Employment, and 
Inflation,"  Journial  of Political  Econiomy, Vol. 77 (September/October  1969),  pp. 721-54; 
and Michael  L. Wachter,  "A Labor Supply Model for Secondary  Workers,"  Review  of 
Economics and Statistics,  Vol.  54 (May  1972), pp. 141-51. 
22. After specifying  the twelve-quarter  lag a priori, I did run the PNFD equations 
using eight- and sixteen-quarter  lags. The overall results are largely  unchanged.  These 
results  on the importance  of product  prices  conform  to those found by Gordon, "Wage- 
Price Controls."  The markedly  higher  long-run  coefficients  for the price terms in the 
equations  estimated  over  the period  ending  1974:2 rather  than 1971:2 are another  indi- 
cation of the difficulty  in estimating  a stable  Phillips  curve.  No attempt  has been  made  to 
correct  for this problem,  largely  because  I am not sure how to accomplish  it. Unstable 
structural  relationships  suggest  limiting  forecasting  to the near  term,  especially  in a market 
as institutionally  complex as the one for labor. The notion of long-run  equilibrium  is 
complicated  by the possibility  of institutional  change as a response to movements  in 
economic variables. o 
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Table 4.  Distributed  Lag Weights for Private Nonfarm Deflator for 
Equation  (3) of Table 3 
Period  Coefficient  t-statistic  Period  Coefficient  t-statistic 
t  ...  ...  t-7  0.0796  3.63 
t-1  0.1889  3.03  t-8  0.0712  3.39 
t-2  0.1577  5.18  t-9  0.0624  2.34 
t-3  0.1333  4.86  t-10  0.0521  1.67 
t-4  0.1144  3.49  t-11  0.0391  1.26 
t-5  0.1000  3.04  t-12  0.0221  1.03 
t-6  0.0889  3.18 
Source: Derived by author. 
tionist findings have also been reported in Gordon's  "variable inflation 
coefficient" and Eckstein-Brinner's  "threshold" price constructs.23 
The official  unemployment  variable appears in Table 3 in unlagged form. 
The coefficient of variation is included as an alternative measure of labor 
market conditions because the results of the CV equations suggest that it 
can be interpreted  as a proxy measure of current  and lagged unemployment 
rates. (The fact  that it  also  includes price effects leads to  a  reduction 
in the long-run coefficient of the inflation term whenever CV is included as 
the labor market variable.) Although no attempt was made to refine this 
variable to make it more suitable as a labor market proxy, it did perform 
about as well as the measured unemployment rate in the equations that 
use PCON and CPI as the inflation variables.24 
SIMULATIONS 
Equations estimated for the periods ending  1971:2  and  1974:2 were 
utilized to forecast future wage developments for alternative predictions of 
changes in the unemployment and inflation rates. The equations ending 
with 1971:2 also provide information on the effect of the recent controls 
program. 
23. See Gordon, "Wage-Price  Controls"; and Otto Eckstein and Roger Brinner, 
The Inflation Process  in the United States,  A Study Prepared  for the Use of the Joint 
Economic  Committee,  92 Cong. 2 sess. (1972). 
24. Attempts  to use the measured  unemployment  rate with polynomial  lags met with 
mixed  success.  The question  of the lagged  response  of wages to unemployment  deserves 
further  work, especially  since the institutional  features  of the labor market  suggest  that 
such lags are important. 522  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1974 
To test  for the  impact  of Phases  I through  IV, the  equations  estimated  for 
the period  ending  1971:2  were  used  to simulate  the predicted  path  of wage 
inflation  over  the controls  period.  Since  the actual  values  of the unemploy- 
ment  rate  and  the  rate  of inflation  were  used,  the exercise  assumes  that  con- 
trols had no impact on unemployment  and studies  its effect on wages, 
taking  its impact  on prices  as given.  The results  suggest  that controls  did 
not directly  slow the rate of wage change. The residuals  of  the wage 
equation  for the period  1971:3  to 1974:2  were,  in fact, positive  on average. 
If controls  did affect  wages,  they must  have worked  indirectly  by slowing 
the rate  of price  inflation.  Hence,  both the wage  inflation  and the relative- 
wage equation  can explain  the 1971-74  period  without  any reference  to a 
stabilizing  influence  from wage controls. Consequently,  the only post- 
controls  wage  bubble  that the economy  may suffer  through  is the indirect 
one resulting  from the decontrolling  of prices.  This effect  through  prices 
could be substantial:  in  1974:2, following the end of most Phase IV 
controls,  PNFD increased  at an annual  rate  of 13.6  percent. 
Forecasts  for  the  period  1974:3  through  1975:4  are  presented  in Table  5. 
The predicted  rates  of wage inflation  are largely  the same, especially  for 
1975  values,  whether  they  are  based  on equation  (2) for the sample  period 
ending 1971:2, or equation  (3) extending  to 1974:2. The actual  value of 
the wage series  is approximately  8.75 percent  for the final quarter  of ob- 
served  data, 1974:2.  As Table 5 demonstrates,  both equations  forecast  a 
higher rate of wage inflation  through 1975:4 for all possible inflation- 
unemployment  scenarios.  In fact, if only a moderate  slowdown  develops 
and inflation  slows  to an annual  rate  of 10  percent  and the unemployment 
rate  remains  below  6 percent  until  the end of 1975:4,  then  the rate  of wage 
inflation  will  rise  throughout  the forecasted  period,  reaching  an annual  rate 
of over 12 percent  by the final  quarter.  Even  in the face of a steep  down- 
turn,  the wage  situation  appears  bleak.  With  inflation  falling  rapidly  to an 
annualized  rate  of 6 percent  by the final  quarter  of 1975  and  the unemploy- 
ment  rate  rising  to 7 percent,  the annual  rate  of wage  inflation,  after  peak- 
ing in 1975:2,  is still  at 10  percent  at the end of 1975.  A question  raised  by 
this simulation  is whether  the rate  of inflation  is likely  to fall to 6 percent  if 
the rate  of wage  change  remains  at 10 percent.  This  consideration  suggests 
that the simulations  in the first  two banks  of Table  5 are  likely  to be more 
realistic  than the other two. The long lags in the wage process,  and the 
feedback  from wages  to prices,  suggest  that wage inflation  will exert  up- 
ward pressure  on prices and prevent  a rapid descent  in the rate of in- Michael L.  Wachter  523 
Table 5.  Wage Forecasts for 1974:3-1975:4,  under  Selected Price 
and Unemployment  Assumptionsa 
Annual rate of wage inflation  in percent 
Equation  1974:3  1974:4  1975:1  1975:2  1975:3  1975:4 
Inflationl  fallinig  rapidly  to 10 percenit  anld  unemnploymenlt 
risinig  rapidly  to 6 percent 
(2)  8.40  9.72  10.76  11.56  12.00  12.24 
(3)  9.56  10.48  11.00  11.44  11.96  12.32 
Iniflationz  fallinig  slowly to 7 percenzt  and uniemnployment 
risinig  slowly to 7 percent 
(2)  8.40  9.72  10.72  11.32  11.48  11.24 
(3)  9.56  10.48  10.96  11.16  11.24  11.08 
Iniflationi  fallinig  slowly to 6 percenit  and unemployment 
rising  slowly  to 7 percent 
(2)  8.40  9.72  10.76  11.24  11.12  10.72 
(3)  9.56  10.48  10.96  11.00  10.68  10.44 
Inflationi  fallinzg  rapidly  to 6 percent  anid  unemploymenlt 
risinig  slowly  to 7 percent 
(2)  8.40  9.56  10.24  10.64  10.56  10.16 
(3)  9.56  10.12  10.28  10.40  10.20  10.00 
Source: Derived by author. 
a.  Prices are defined by the private nonfarm deflator. 
flation.  Even  if a slowdown  does  develop,  progress  in reducing  the inflation 
rate is likely  to be very  slow through  at least the end of 1975. 
Conclusion 
In this paper  I have examined  wage developments  from three  perspec- 
tives-movements  in interindustry  wage  differentials  within  the  context  of a 
relative-wage  equation, wage contract settlements, and overall wage 
changes  as the dependent  variable  of a Phillips-curve  type of equation. 
In spite of minor  skirmishes  and considerable  noise-natural trappings 
of the wage negotiation  process-the labor front has been more or less 
predictable  over the period of inflation, 1968-74. Relative-wage  equa- 
tions explain  the widening  of the wage structure  since 1969 as a catch- 
up process  as labor  market  conditions  loosened.  The  recent  steel  settlement, 
although  generous,  was about what  could have  been expected,  given eco- 
nomic  conditions  at the  time.  In early  1974  economists  and  negotiators  alike 524  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1974 
were predicting a healthy upswing in the economy beginning in late 1974, 
and the steel and aluminum businesses were booming. 
The evidence strongly suggests the existence of long lags between wage 
change and its economic determinants.  These long lags, which are observ- 
able in the relative-wage  equation, the nature of contract settlements, and 
the wage-inflation  equation, arise from the interplay of neoclassical market 
forces in a  world with institutional features such as labor unions  and 
oligopolies. Lag weights that are statistically significant more than two 
years into the past are not surprising, given the existence of labor union 
contracts, but they have not received sufficient  attention in the literature.25 
The outlook  for wage inflation for the remainder of  1974 and  1975 
appears grim. Given the range of forecasts of inflation and unemployment 
now available, the equations of Table 3 indicate that the rate of wage 
change will be higher at the end of 1975 than it is at present. Indeed, even 
if a significant downturn develops, wage inflation is predicted to  be  at 
approximately 10 percent through 1975:4. This short-term rigidity in the 
rate of money-wage change, which is based on the long lags in the wage 
equation, should hinder any significant  slowing in the rate of price inflation. 
The resulting  gain in real wages, as predicted  by the relative-wage  equation, 
will accrue largely to the unionized sector as a result of the recent contract 
settlements. Because of lags, labor, which often appears to  be the hero 
during expansions, will appear to be the villain again in the next contrac- 
tion. 
Discussion 
JOSEPH PECHMAN  and R. J. Gordon were inclined to place more empha- 
sis than Wachter  did on wage-price  controls in explaining the recent history 
of wages. Pechman called attention to the modest settlements of 1972 and 
25. A major exception  is the work of Otto Eckstein  and Thomas A.  Wilson, "The 
Determination  of Money  Wages  in American  Industry,"  Quiarterly  Jouirnial  of Economics, 
Vol. 76 (August  1962),  pp. 379-414.  They recognized  the lags in the labor market  and the 
importance  of using the wage round as the observation  period. Unfortunately,  their in- 
sights  were  largely  neglected  when the profession  moved to the quarterly  models needed 
for forecasting  purposes. More recent wQrk  on lags includes Gordon, "Inflation in 
Recession  and Recovery,"  and "Wage-Price  Controls." Michael  L. Wachter  525 
1973 (as shown in Wachter's  Table 1), sandwiched between rapid increases 
in 1969-71 and in 1974; he viewed that record as evidence that Phases I 
and II had had some effect. Wachter thought the moderate size of the settle- 
ments of 1972 and 1973 might be misleading. The decrease in wage settle- 
ments during the controls period was far more pronounced in first-year 
changes than in life-of-contract changes. Wachter suggested that the front 
loading of contract settlements could be indicative of a catch-up effect. 
Gordon stressed  the role of price controls in stiffening employer resistance 
to large wage increases. 
Several participants commented  on  the  presence  of  product  prices 
rather than consumer prices in Wachter's preferred  wage equation. While 
agreeing that consumer prices could also play a role from the supply side 
in determining  wages, some were glad to see product prices (as measured 
by the private nonfarm deflator) come through as an important element in 
the demand curve for labor. R. A. Gordon suggested that product prices 
may serve a dual function in the equation, reflecting  both the cost of living 
to workers and the profitability of firms. Robert Hall saw product prices 
as the price of value added, or something close to wages themselves. This 
squared  with his view of a wage-wage, rather than a wage-price, spiral. 
Franco Modigliani thought Wachter was going beyond his empirical 
results  in explaining wages in terms of the expectations of unions. None of 
Wachter's equations incorporates expectations and yet they all perform 
quite well in explaining the coefficient of variation of wages. Modigliani 
preferred  to interpret  the variation in the gap between union and nonunion 
wages as the result of the different reactions the two sectors have to unem- 
ployment and inflation. Union wages reflect inflation more and unemploy- 
ment less than do  nonunionized wages, according to  Modigliani's own 
empirical  research. 
Interpreting  Wachter's results in terms of the concepts of his own paper, 
Hall felt that the scale wage was interpreted  as if it were the effective wage. 
In the event of recession or boom, the two might diverge markedly. 
R. J. Gordon pointed to the considerable increase in the coefficient of 
the price-change  variable in the wage equations over the last three years. In 
his judgment, this development called into question any econometric model 
that assumes constant coefficients since 1954. 